Purpose: This is a policy paper that analyzes the economic impact of mandated employment quotas for citizen workers among firms in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). We demonstrate the nature of the efficiency losses associated with these quotas, and then explore a workable policy alternative that can achieve the same employment objectives with lower efficiency loss.
I. Introduction
Countries around the world have provided economists and policy analysts with a plethora of interesting examples of programs and policies that, though often adopted for admirable reasons, have gone astray and produced unintended and counter-productive results. In recent years, the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 1 have adopted labor quota policies designed to boost employment of their own nationals in the private sector workforce. These policies appear to be a good candidate for inclusion in this list of counter-productive policies and, despite virtually universal adoption by countries in the GCC, have largely escaped serious economic analysis.
These policies are designed to address an increasingly important issue in the Gulf region.
Namely, all GCC countries have large expatriate workforces and all have high unemployment rates among their own citizens, with particularly low rates of native employment in the private sector (Forstenlechner and Rutledge, 2011 and Forstenlechner et al. 2012) .
Emiratization, the policy adopted by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), is typical of countries in the GCC. 2 One feature of Emiratization is a mandate requiring target industries to maintain a minimum ratio of Emirati workers to expatriate workers. In this paper, we explore the implications of these mandated quotas. Our analysis suggests that the policy approach adopted by GCC countries generally, and the UAE in particular, will, at a minimum, reduce economic growth and frustrate attempts to increase citizen employment, and, at worst, will actually reduce the number of jobs available to citizen workers.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section II we provide a brief description of the background and core pillars of "Emiratization" policy. We outline important features of the UAE 1 The GCC countries are Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. 2 All other GCC countries pursue similar policies, e.g. Saudization in Saudi Arabia and Omanization in Oman.
labor market in Section III. Section IV contains a brief review of literature on employment regulation and Section V contains our analysis of the implications for Emirati employment of the current Emiratization policy. In Section VI, we propose a policy alternative that addresses some of the inefficiencies associated with the quotas imposed by Emiratization. Section VII contains our concluding comments.
II. Emiratization Policy
The UAE is a small country, in both income and population, which has grown rapidly over the last few decades. Prior to the financial crisis of 2008, the UAE regularly exceeded 7%
annualized GDP growth (CIA). Oil exports, which yield extraordinary revenue, have been the primary engine of this growth. However, the limited skills and work experience of Emirati workers has meant that migrant labor has been required to achieve the country's high rate of growth.
Current estimates by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) put the expatriate population at about 90% of the UAE's total population. Tables 1 and 2 provide estimates of the percentage of Emirati nationals in the workforce by labor categories for the emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the two largest emirates. Emiratis comprise only 5.0% of the labor force in Dubai (excluding the Public Administration and National Defense sectors which hire a large proportion of Emiratis) and only 13.5% in Abu Dhabi. Rapid growth in expatriate employment has been accompanied by high and rising unemployment among Emiratis. A recent government estimate sets unemployment at 13% for UAE nationals overall, and at 23.1% for young UAE nationals (The National, January 13, 2011).
4 High, and rising, unemployment of Emirati nationals is one of the most pressing problems currently facing the UAE and it has become a dominating issue in the UAE's economic and political discourse. Until recently, public entities have been able to ameliorate this friction by employing large numbers of Emiratis in the public sector, but at this point the public sector is no longer able to absorb all new Emirati workers entering the labor force. 4 Estimates and reports vary significantly by source, but one important thing to note is that residence visas are tied to employment for expatriates, so the unemployment rate among expatriates is effectively zero. Thus, the unemployment rate among Emiratis will always be significantly higher than the reported overall unemployment rate. 5 The UAE government is increasingly concerned about labor costs in maintaining its large public sector workforce, which is described at this point as "saturated" (The National, January 12, 2011 
III. The UAE Labor Market
Before addressing the consequences of Emiratization, it is perhaps worth noting a few stylized facts about the UAE labor market that constitute the context for our analysis. First, 6 Not all jobs or all sectors are subject to Emiratization quotas. The government specifically targets relatively highskill job classifications. Finance, banking, insurance and aerospace engineering are among the industries specifically targeted by the government. (Gulf News, February 24, 2011; Emiratization in Abu Dhabi) . 7 In addition, the government appears to be cracking down on firms that satisfy the quotas on paper by using "ghost workers" who appear on employment rosters but do not actually work (The National May 5, 2011) . Kuwait is another regional example. Members of the legislature there are proposing to reduce the number of foreigners from 2.7 million to 1.35 million within the next five years, to impose country-specific quotas for expatriate workers and to limit expatriate workers to five years of employment in Kuwait. (Gulf News, February 1, 2014 (2006) has specifically warned that wage increases are not adequately tied to productivity in the public sector and that they have far outpaced productivity increases generally. Public sector wages that are well above competitive levels engender a preference for public sector jobs among Emirati workers, making it difficult for private firms to compete for these workers. Additionally, there is a prevailing view among private sector employers that Emirati workers who accept private sector jobs are likely to leave when there is an opening in the public sector. This appears to contribute to the reluctance of private firms to hire, and incur training costs, for workers whom they perceive as "short-timers."
Seventh, wage convergence among Emirati and expatriate labor need not hold in equilibrium because mobility for expatriate workers within the UAE labor market is limited.
Expatriates are not allowed to change jobs without the express consent of their current employer, and employers sponsor the employee's residence visa. As a consequence, changing jobs can be costly for expatriate workers. In some cases, those who wish to change jobs, even when the job change coincides with the end of their labor contract, must leave the country for at least six months before they are allowed to return. In short, changing jobs effectively requires a sacrifice of six months of income. The following quote appears to speak to the heart of the matter (Gulf All of these factors constitute barriers, either supply-side or demand-side, to private sector employment of Emiratis. Generous welfare programs both reduce the incentive for
Emiratis to work and raise the reservation wage for those who do enter the labor force. This, combined with the extremely attractive working conditions in the public sector, significantly curtails private sector labor supply among Emiratis. On the demand side, private employers view Emiratis both as relatively unproductive and highly protected. 11 Expatriate workers are far less risky from the perspective of employers, especially since their mobility is limited by law.
IV. Related Work
Other countries in the Gulf region face a similar problem and have adopted domestic labor market regulations similar to those adopted in the UAE. However, previous work on private sector employment mandates for national labor is scarce. Russel (1989) observes that in Kuwait, a country moving forward with Kuwaitization, migrants have become "deeply embedded" in the Kuwaiti society and labor force. As a result, they have amassed significant job-specific capital, and so the costs of replacing them with nationals are high.
In Bahrain, another GCC state facing a similar problem, Franklin (1985) argues that the process for distributing a share of the country's prosperity to citizens in the form of benefits and subsidies emphasizes status and authority rather than productivity. War, the IMF reported that that the ratio of non-Kuwaiti to Kuwaitis was 41%, only slightly below pre-war levels. 12 That is, after a large exogenous shock and an opportunity for the country to reconsider its employment of migrants, it returned essentially to where it had started.
The economic literature on employment protection and labor productivity in general is extensive. However, this particular variety of regulation is somewhat different because it sets quotas for a particular input (Emirati labor) as a function of the amount of some other input employed (expatriate labor).
Employment protection laws such as those found in Europe have been studied extensively. Saint-Paul (2002) There is no work, of which we are aware, that attempts to measure the efficiency implications of Emiratization for the UAE economy. The overreaching issue in this lack of research appears to be data availability. It is difficult to overstate the lack of reliable data availability in the UAE and in the region generally. IMF reports consistently warn of "structural weaknesses with respect to data quality, coverage, periodicity, timeliness [and] consistency" in the UAE's economic statistics. Even commonly reported aggregate statistics like inflation rates and unemployment rates are either unavailable for the UAE or are generally regarded as unreliable. Thus, while there are no data available to calibrate the magnitude of our model's implications, we can address in general terms the nature of the economic consequences and present a framework for estimating these consequences given appropriate data. That is the task to which we now turn.
V. The Model
To study the impact of the emiratization quota on Emirati employment, we consider a model where a representative firm uses a production function with three inputs: capital (K), native Emirati labor (N) and expatriate labor (E). The production function ( , , ) is assumed to be continuous, twice-differentiable and everywhere strictly concave. For ease of exposition, we here assume that the representative firm is small and is a price-taker in both output and input markets. The appendix extends the analysis to the case of market power in both the product market and in the input markets; the qualitative nature of the results is the same. The emiratization quota requires that a fraction of the labor used in the production of the final good be Emirati labor. Letting denote the product price, the price of capital, the price of native Emirati labor and the price of expatriate labor, the firm's objective is to maximize:
Subject to the emiratization quota, parameterized as:
The Lagrangian corresponding to this constrained maximization problem is:
The first order conditions determining labor employment are:
Setting both equal to zero, and letting denote the marginal revenue product of Emirati workers and denote the marginal revenue product of expatriate workers gives:
Dividing (7) by (6) gives:
A binding quota implies that − < 0. If Emirati workers were more productive on the margin than their wage, then the firm would employ supra-quota levels of Emirati workers voluntarily. Given this, (8) implies that − > 0. Had there been no regulation, the firm would have employed both types of labor up to the point where marginal revenue product and wage are equal. The quota distorts productive efficiency in that it forces the firm to use an input bundle that is not cost minimizing -on the margin, Emirati workers are less productive than the wage they are paid, while expatriate workers are more productive than the wage they are paid.
The expression in (8) shows that the magnitude of this distortion depends on the quota rate, . Table 3 shows the degree to which the quota distorts the ratio of marginal products, as a function of , for the case where the quota is binding. Observe that it rises at an increasing rate as rises and approaches infinity as approaches 1. This certainly leaves open the possibility that, in an attempt to raise , the distortion will induce to firm to lower overall employment so much that the total number of jobs available to Emirati workers actually falls in response to an increase in . Later in this section, we show simulation results for specific functional forms of the production function that highlight this possibility. Table 3 : Ratio of marginal products for different quota rates
To think about the firm-level distortion in more detail, we start with the case where Emirati and expatriate labor are perfect substitutes, indistinguishable in the production process. If < , then the firm will use only expatriate labor in the absence of regulation. In this case, a higher quota substantively amounts to an increase in the composite wage
since each unit of labor must be employed in this proportion. The firm will reduce its overall employment of labor in order to bring labor's marginal revenue product back to equality with the higher composite wage. There is both an increase in intensity of capital employment (the substitution effect) and a general scaling back of output (the output effect) that contribute to the reduction in labor usage
In this case, because the two types of labor are indistinguishable, the inequality between marginal revenue product and wages identified in (8) is strictly attributable to wage differences, and indeed Emirati workers are paid more than expatriates with the same qualifications, as noted in section III. However, we also noted in section III significant evidence that the two types of workers are not perfect substitutes, and that in fact < , at least in expectation.
Discharge protection and the high number of Emirati workers who exit the private sector soon after the firm invests in a costly training period reduce the employer's expectation of an Emirati worker's long-term productivity. 14 Furthermore, the generous welfare state for Emiratis, attractive working conditions in the public sector and limited mobility for expatriate workers all widen the artificial wage gap between Emirati and expatriate workers.
These results extend to both to firms that produce output in imperfectly competitive markets and to firms that buy their inputs in imperfectly competitive markets, as shown in the appendix.
Imperfect competition in the product market distorts marginal revenue product below the competitive level by the same proportion for both Emirati workers and expatriate workers.
Imperfect competition in the input markets distorts the marginal factor cost of hiring an additional worker above the wage rate, with the larger distortion in the market with the more inelastic labor supply. Given the small size of the UAE economy and the ease with which local firms can retain expatriate workers, we can assume that firms face a highly wage elastic supply of expatriate workers. Thus, the larger distortion of marginal factor cost is for Emirati labor, which only strengthens the conclusions here.
To illustrate more concretely the nature of the quota's impacts on Emirati employment for a profit maximizing firm, we consider a firm with a CES production function that solves the optimization problem defined in (1) and (2). We will start with a simple baseline case before exploring the sensitivity of the results to variations in the parameters of the problem. Our baseline case is a firm with production function:
14 That Emirati labor is less productive than expatriate labor on the margin is obvious prima facie since quotas are binding. As noted earlier, the IMF (2006) warns generally that wage increases appear to exceed productivity gains and specifically cautions that wage increases in the public sector are not sufficiently tied to productivity. This spills over to private sector firms hiring Emiratis because of the abundance of public-sector jobs held by Emiratis.
We begin by assuming that all input costs are equal and normalized to 1. Figure 1 shows how the profit-maximizing level of Emirati employment varies with the quota rate .
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Figure 1: Emirati employment for different quota rates
Given the form of the production function, the optimal input employment in the absence of a quota is to hire equal numbers of Emirati and expatriate workers. Thus, quota rates that are lower than = 0.5 are not binding and have no impact on Emirati employment. Increasing the quota rate above = 0.5 initially increases Emirati employment, but eventually reduces Emirati employment even below the level that would have existed without regulation. As compliance costs grow, the firm complies with the labor quota not by hiring more Emirati labor, but by substituting capital and by scaling back its production. This simple example demonstrates that the number of Emirati workers hired may actually fall in response to higher Emirati employment quotas. We now proceed to consider a number of variations on this baseline case that demonstrate the sensitivity of this result to the parameters of the problem, guided by our discussion of the UAE labor market in section III.
Our baseline case assumes that Emirati and expatriate wages are equal, but we know from section III that Emirati workers are paid substantially more than expatriate workers with the same skill set. Figure 2 illustrates the profit-maximizing level of Emirati level employment for a firm with the production function in (9), and with expatriate wage normalized to = 1, but with Emirati wage > 1. As illustrated on the diagram, Emirati wages that are higher than expatriate wages reduce the threshold level for which higher quota rates are actually able to increase Emirati employment. This makes intuitive sense since compliance becomes even more expensive as the Emirati wage grows, leading the firm to more quickly substitute capital or scale back production. 
In this case, < 1 represents the degree to which an Emirati worker is less productive than an expatriate worker. Figure 3 shows the profit-maximizing level of Emirati employment for firms with production functions in (10), for various levels of . Similar to inflated Emirati wages, lower productivity of Emirati workers relative to expatriate workers reduces the threshold quota rate for which increases in have the potential to create additional Emirati jobs.
Figure 3: Emirati workers less productive than expatriate workers A third issue is that different industries may face a different level of substitutability across inputs. To study this possibility, we consider production functions of the following form:
For CES production functions, declines in indicate less substitutability across inputs; the limit as → −∞ is a Leontief production function with no substitutability across inputs. Figure 4 shows the profit-maximizing level of Emirati employment for firms with production functions in (11), for various values of . Here, the effect is twofold. As inputs become less and less substitutable, the total number of Emirati employees may rise. For example, a company may need native speakers with local connections for customer relations. On the other hand, the firm has fewer options to substitute to capital inputs as a cost control measure when the quota rises, so the output effect is stronger and induces a more rapid decline in Emirati job openings as the firm's profit-maximizing output falls. Overall, it is not straightforward that higher quota rates will create more jobs for Emirati workers among profit-maximizing firms. Higher Emirati wages, lower productivity of Emirati workers and a relatively inelastic labor supply among Emirati workers aggravate the problem, and these phenomena are all characteristic of the UAE labor market.
Our analysis focuses on profit-maximizing choices at the firm level. For general equilibrium analysis at the market level, we refer the reader to Marchon and Toledo (2014) for perfectly competitive markets and to Toledo (2013) for imperfect competition. In the perfectly competitive case, rising unit costs from employment quotas can spur exit from the industry and higher consumer prices, leading to deadweight losses in product markets. The possibility that exit can reduce Emirati employment opportunities is particularly problematic for firms such as financial institutions that can easily outsource services. There is anecdotal evidence that this is already happening. Practically, capital-intensive industries appear to be the main targets of Emiratization policy. Jobs in Arab culture represent status and authority, as discussed in section IV, and the Emirati population has shown little interest in labor-intensive industries. If capital-intensive industries send large numbers of expatriate workers back to their home countries in order to comply with the quota, the output effect from rising factor prices could be significant and could drive these industries out of the UAE completely. Recent studies on the Nitaqat (employment quota) system in Saudi Arabia by Ramady (2013) and Peck (2013) demonstrate that this is a real possibility, and that the distortions could be large. For example, Peck finds that the program increased the number of Saudi workers hired only by 96,000 workers, which amounts to a 0.2% increase, over a 16-month period, but the cost was significant and the program caused approximately 11,000 firms to shut down, a nearly 50% increase in the exit rate.
For the imperfectly competitive case, Toledo (2013) suggests that the general equilibrium impact of Emiratization may be less severe in markets where firms earn substantial monopoly rents, as Emiratization costs can be paid out of excess profits without necessarily inducing exit.
The overall point is that Emiratization quotas create distortions on more than one front, and that there is the potential to create harm for Emirati workers that offsets whatever benefits Emiratization creates.
VI. A Policy Alternative -Taxation and Emiratization
The Emirati employment quota embedded in the Emiratization program has at least three major flaws. First, the 55% target set for Emirati employment appears to be arbitrary. Second, the program targets employment rather than productivity. Third, the policy has been implemented without apparent consideration for differences in production technologies across domestic industries. As a direct consequence of these flaws, the increased costs associated with meeting employment quotas will reduce overall labor usage and that will, at least in part, offset the higher proportion of jobs allocated to Emiratis. Further, the relationship between Emirati and expatriate labor could feature either substitutability or complementarity. If Emirati and expatriate labor are substitutes, then jobs for Emiratis can be created by reducing the expatriate labor force.
However, it may also be the case that relatively low-wage expatriate workers sustain jobs among the Emirati population in some industries.
We now turn to a workable alternative that, while not fully addressing all of the flaws of Emiratization, can reduce the efficiency losses experienced by firms and, hence, reduce the detrimental impact of the policy on Emirati employment.
Suppose that firms have the option to "buy out" of the Emiratization quota. That is, a firm can choose to satisfy * = ( + ) or can choose to pay a tax of for each worker by which it is short of the quota * . That is, the firm's total tax bill is ̅ = ( * − ). Substituting back the definition of the quota gives:
For a firm that opts to ignore the quota and pay the tax, the profit function is:
The solution is similar to the case above. We can obtain the same characterization of the profitmaximizing input allocation among the two types of workers given in (8). There is an interesting difference, though. In this case, first order conditions give:
The left side can be thought of as the net marginal benefit of disregarding the quota by one more worker. The firm gains one more expatriate worker who is more productive than his wage and discharges one Emirati worker who is less productive than his wage on the margin. The firm will continue to take advantage of the buyout up to the point where the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost, .
On the other hand, for a firm that obeys the quota completely, the first order conditions corresponding to the constrained optimization problem in (3) give:
In this case, we interpret the Lagrange multiplier as the "shadow benefit" at the optimum of relaxing the constraint by one worker.
Combining (14) and (15), it is now easy to see which firms will take advantage of the buyout. If the production process is such that the tax exceeds the marginal benefit of relaxing the constraint by even one worker (i.e. if > ), then the firm will not use the buyout and will satisfy the quota completely. However, if the benefit is sufficient, then the firm will use the buyout, and will continue to use it up to the level where marginal benefit equals marginal cost, as
in (14). For firms that pay the tax, marginal compliance costs are equated across firms.
This scheme is analogous to the well-known result that emissions taxes can achieve the same abatement in pollution at lower cost to society than uniform emissions quotas -the latter can result in wildly divergent marginal compliance costs. The buyout allows firms with dire cost consequences of complying with the Emiratization quota to ignore it at a cost. The firms complying with the mandate in full will be those that can comply with the lowest costs on the margin.
A simple numerical example suffices to illustrate the way in which this scheme can induce efficiency improvements. Consider two equally-sized firms that each could create 7 jobs for Emirati workers. Table 4 shows the marginal compliance cost for each additional job created.
Note that firm A's compliance costs are lower than firm B's compliance costs. Perhaps firm A has jobs that are currently vacant and could be staffed by newly trained Emirati workers, but firm B relies heavily on incumbent workers who have skills specific to the position, so it is relatively more costly for firm B to increase its employment of Emirati workers. By contrast, a lower-cost way to create eight Emirati jobs is to for Firm A to create five jobs and for Firm B to create only three jobs, which reduces total compliance costs to 160. This can be achieved by setting the quota at five Emirati workers but allowing firms to buy out of it by paying a tax 30 < < 40 for each worker by which it is short of the quota. It is easy to see that Firm A will obey the quota, but that Firm B is better off by hiring only three Emirati workers and paying the tax instead of hiring the fourth and fifth workers. Thus, this combination of the tax and quota induces the efficient distribution of the eight Emirati jobs across firms. This is only second-best efficiency in the sense that the scheme still increases social costs relative to no regulation, but it does improve efficiency (relative to the quota alone) subject to the constraint that eight Emirati jobs must be created.
Thus, policymakers can set tax and quota rates jointly to achieve Emirati employment objectives by sector. While the government may have various short-run and long-run objectives in mind as it implements labor policy, the point is that the combination of a buyout and a quota allows the government to create jobs for Emiratis while minimizing efficiency losses experienced by firms and ultimately passed on to those Emiratis themselves. Industry-level data on differential productivity and wages and on capital-labor ratios are needed to calibrate these tax rates and quotas. As discussed earlier in the paper, these data are not presently available, and indeed the lack of reliable data available to researchers and policymakers constitutes a major impediment to concrete policy formation and evaluation in the UAE.
VII. Conclusion
There is no question that increasing private-sector employment among UAE nationals is an important policy goal for the rulers of the UAE; improving standards of living for their people keeps their support intact. However, a structural change of this nature will be effective and sustainable when it arises organically from market-based conditions -it cannot permanently remain the product of government mandate without the kinds of negative consequences that accompany regulation.
At its core, Emiratization misses the mark by targeting employment rather than productivity. For a country to make progress, people need not just to have a job but to do a job.
Increasing the skill set of Emiratis is important, but no single policy remedy will address the issue of Emirati employment effectively in the absence of broad institutional reform.
Government handouts and unrealistically posh working conditions in the public sector raise significant barriers to employing Emiratis in the private sector. Nonexistent mobility of the expatriate workforce artificially widens the wage gap even further.
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Emiratization aims to help Emirati workers find jobs in the private sector, but our analysis shows that a quota is an unattractive way of going about this objective, particularly
given the institutional characteristics of the UAE labor market. Developing a productive and competitive Emirati labor force in the UAE will continue to challenge UAE policymakers.
Appendix: Extension to the case of imperfect competition in the product market and in the labor market
For ease of notation, the main text considers the case where both output and inputs are priced competitively. This appendix extends the analysis to imperfect competition in both the output market and in the market for labor inputs. In this case, the product price is a decreasing function of output ( , , ), and the wage functions ( ) and ( ) are increasing in employment of each input. That is, higher wages must be paid in order to attract a larger number of workers. The firm's constrained profit-maximization problem is now characterized by the Here, and denote the marginal physical product of Emirati and expatriate labor, respectively; is the price elasticity of demand for the final product; and denote the wage elasticity for Emirati and expatriate labor supply, respectively. Combining the two equations above into an expression analogous to (8) gives: With respect to the product market, the intuition is that price has to be cut when output increases as a result of additional input employment. This distorts the marginal revenue product below that from the competitive case. As → −∞ and the product market approaches perfect competition, the marginal revenue product of hiring an additional worker converges to that given by the competitive case in (8). Of note, imperfect competition in the product market distorts the marginal revenue product of both Emirati and expatriate labor by the same proportion.
With respect to the input market, the intuition is that hiring more workers requires offering a higher wage to all workers, which raises the marginal factor cost of hiring an additional worker above the wage paid to that worker. As input employment approaches perfect competition, with → ∞ and → ∞, the marginal factor cost of employing an additional worker converges to the wage, as in (8). Importantly for our analysis in the main text, the larger distortion of marginal factor cost occurs in the labor sector with the more inelastically supplied labor.
